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The Role of the States in Combating Managed 
Care Fraud and Abuse 
by Joan H. Krause* 
INTRODUCTION 
The recent growth of managed care cost containment strate­
gies has attracted a great deal of attention to the issues of qual­
ity of, and access to, health care services. Many concerns have 
focused on the potential effects of an increasingly cost-conscious 
health care system on the traditional physician-patient relation­
ship, patient treatment choices, and broader issues of patient 
rights. These concerns have in tum fueled a so-called "back­
lash" against managed care, resulting in a growing number of 
laws and initiatives designed to prohibit what are perceived as 
particularly egregious activities undertaken by managed care 
organizations.1 
Although the quest for adequate patient protections is likely 
to continue, the focus of governmental investigations into man­
aged care has begun to shift. Recognizing that a significant por­
tion of the United States population now receives its health care 
through managed care organizations (and that a significant por­
tion of health care reimbursement now flows to such entities), 
the federal and state governments have begun to investigate 
whether these organizations are in fact delivering what is being 
paid for - and whether the failure to do so constitutes health 
care fraud. At the federal level, for example, the Department of 
Health and Human Services Office of the Inspector General's 
("OIG's") 1999 Work Plan includes several initiatives designed 
to assess both the activities of and the reimbursement paid to 
managed care organizations under the Medicare and Medicaid 
programs.2 Similarly, officials in many states have announced a 
* Assistant Professor of Law, Institute for Health Law, Loyola University of Chi­
cago School of Law. 
1. See, e.g., Robert J. Blendon et al., Understanding the Managed Care Backlash,
HEALTH AFF., July/Aug. 1998, at 82, 83. See also Louise G. Trubek, Informing, Claim­
ing, Contracting: Enforcement in the Managed Care Era, 8 ANNALS HEALTH L. 133
(1999). 
2. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN­
ERAL, WORK PLAN: FISCAL YEAR 1999: HEALTH CARE FINANCING AnMINISTRA-
179 
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centralized, multi-level attack on managed care fraud in both 
the public and private sectors.3 
This Article will focus on the weapons wielded by state regu­
lators in the fight against managed care fraud. Though recent 
discussions of health care fraud have concentrated on federal ef­
forts, this Article will argue that it is the states, using a variety of 
legal theories, that have the most flexibility to address fraudu­
lent managed care practices. This flexibility, in tum, allows state 
regulators to craft penalties and structure settlements that are 
tailored to the specific misconduct at issue. These precisely 
targeted anti-fraud efforts, in contrast to some of the broader 
federal provisions, may allow state regulators to resolve 
problems more efficiently, with fewer interruptions in patient 
access to care - thus benefitting the patient population the laws 
were designed to protect. 
I. FRAUD IN MANAGED CARE
For most of this century, health care in the United States was 
provided on a fee-for-service basis. Under this system, physi­
cians charged for medical care on a per-service basis, such as the 
amount of time spent with the patient or the procedures per­
formed. Until the Great Depression, patients generally paid 
these charges directly out of their own pockets, and physician 
charges, by necessity, were limited by the amount of money pa­
tients could afford to pay.4 In response to problems faced dur­
ing the Depression by physicians and hospitals with an 
increasingly cash-strapped patient base, the concept of health 
"insurance" was developed .. Initially, such insurance was of­
fered on an "indemp.ity" basis: the physician's bill was paid by 
the patient, who later was reimbursed by the insurer for a pre­
set portion of the expenses. Over time, insurance was also of­
fered on a "service" basis, under which the physician received 
TION PROJECTS 22-27, (visited Feb. 21, 1998) <http://www.dhhs.gov/progorg/oig/ 
wrkpln/1999/99hcfawp. pdf>. 
3. See, e.g., New York: New Bureau for Health Care Issues Set Up By Attorney
General's Office, BNA's HEALTH L. REP., May 8, 1997, at 19 (describing new bureau 
created by Attorney General Dennis C. Vacco, whose duties would include investiga­
tion of certain HMO practices). 
4. See Gary T. Schwartz, A National Health Care Program: What its Effect Would
Be On American Tort Law and Malpractice Law, 79 CORNELL L. REv. 1339, 1358-59 
(1994); MARC A. RoowIN, MEDICINE, MoNEY, AND MoRALS: PHYSICIANS' CON­
FLICTS OF INTEREST 3 (1993). 
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payment directly from the insurer under a predetermined fee 
schedule.5 
Clearly, the fee-for-service system created an economic con­
flict of interest for the physician, since "[t]he more services the 
doctor provided, the greater was his income."6 Physicians thus 
had a financial incentive to overtreat their patients in an attempt 
to boost their own incomes, most commonly by ordering serv­
ices that the patient did not actually need. Unfortunately, the 
growth of health insurance only exacerbated this temptation. 
Once payment for the bulk of treatment costs was supplied by a 
"deep pocket" insurance company, both physicians and patients 
were insulated from their previous budgetary limits, and pa­
tients' financial constraints no longer operated as a check on 
physician charges.7 Eventually, virtually unlimited third-party 
reimbursement was accompanied by the rapid development and 
diffusion of highly advanced ( and highly expensive) medical 
technologies, as well as a rapidly aging patient population -
leading to a rapid increase in health care expenditures.8 While 
health care made up only five percent of the Gross National 
Product in_ 1950, it reached twelve percent in the early 1990s, 
and is predicted to grow to fifteen percent by the year 2000.9 
In response to the escalating cost of health care, the largest 
health care payers - primarily businesses and the federal and 
state governments - increasingly have turned to mechanisms 
designed to contain health care costs. The primary cost contain­
ment strategy has been to replace providers' traditional incen­
tives to maximize the volume of services provided with 
incentives designed to do the opposite - generally by putting 
physicians at "financial risk" for the costs of services they pro­
vide or initiate.10 The use of such incentives commonly is re­
ferred to as "managed care," and the entities adopting such 
5. See Alexander M. Capron, Containing Health Care Costs: Ethical and Legal
Implications of Changes in the Methods of Paying Physicians, 36 CASE W. REs. L.
REV. 708, 712 (1986). 
6. See Rodwin, supra note 4, at 2.
7. See id. at 14.
8. See, e.g., E. Haavi Morreim, BALANCING Acr: THE NEW MEDICAL ETHICS OF
MEDICINE'S NEW ECONOMICS 9-13 (1995). 
9. See E. Haavi Morreim, Economic Disclosure and Economic Advocacy: New
Duties in the Medical Standard of Care, 12 J. LEG. MEo. 275, 280-81 (1991). 
10. See E. Haavi Morreim, Diverse and Perverse Incentives of Managed Care:
Bringing Patients Into Alignment, 1 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 89-90 (1996); Barry R. Fur­
row, Managed Care Organizations and Patient Injury: Rethinking Liability, 31 GA. L.
REv. 419, 429-30 (1997). 
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constraints are known as "managed care organizations" 
("MCOs").11 The primary method by which MCOs shift finan­
cial risk to physicians is through "capitation," whereby the 
MCO pays a single fee to the physician for providing complete 
care to an enrollee for a set period of time. The physician re­
ceives the same amount of money for each enrollee regardless 
of how many services are actually provided; because payment 
for additional services comes directly out of the physician's 
pocket, capitation removes the physician's incentive to order un­
necessary services. 12 
Conceptually, managed care organizations both provide serv­
ices to patients through contracted health care providers, and 
administer the provision of such services. Because of the sheer 
number of individuals and entities involved, and the variety of 
financial relationships that exist among them, both MCOs and 
their contracted providers have opportunities to engage in a 
wide variety of improper activities related to the delivery of 
health care.13 For example, MCOs may defraud their contracted 
providers by delaying payment or refusing to pay for previously 
approved services, and may defraud employers or government 
11. In its most restrictive form, "managed care" can refer solely to health mainte­
nance organizations ("HMOs"), which offer a wide range of health care services at a 
fixed price in return for limiting enrollees to a defined network of health care provid­
ers and employing strict utilization guidelines and referral restrictions. More broadly, 
however, "managed care" may be used to refer to any type of health insurance plan 
that utilizes any type of cost containment mechanism, such as requiring approval 
before patients are hospitalized for elective surgery. Thus, many so-called "managed 
care" strategies have been adopted by traditional insurers as well. See Schwartz, 
supra note 4, at 1362 (noting many fee-for-service plans are now subject to cost con­
tainment mechanisms, such as utilization review). 
12. See, e.g., Morreim, ''Diverse and Perverse Incentives," supra note 10, at 91;
David Orentlicher, Paying Physicians More to Do Less: Financial Incentives to Limit 
Care, 30 U. R1ctt. L. REv. 155, 158-59 (1996). Many MCOs also have adopted "bo­
nus" or "withhold" systems, in which pools of funds are set aside to cover the costs of 
certain. types of ancillary services; any funds remaining in the pool at the end of the 
year are distributed. to the physicians. See id. at 159-60. 
13. See, e.g., Sharon L. Davies & Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Managed Care: Placebo
or Wonder Drug for Health Care Fraud and Abuse? 31 GA. L. REv. 373, 385-93 
(1997); Jerry L. Mashaw & Theodore R. Marmor, Conceptualizing, Estimating, and 
Reforming Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Healthcare Spending, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 455, 
491 (1994) (questioning whether managed care cost savings "are eliminating waste or 
merely eliminating access to needed services"); Alan Bloom & Charles B. Oppen­
heimer, Fraud in Managed Care: Old Wine in New Bottles, 18 WHITIIER L. REv. 13 
(1996). It is important to recognize that fraud may be perpetrated both by the MCO 
(e.g., when fraudulent charges are submitted to payers) and on the MCO (e.g., when 
contracted providers inflate their charges to the MCO). See, e.g., Gabriel Imperato 
& Jennifer Steward, Perspectives: Managed Care Plans Are Victims, Perpetrators of 
Fraud & Abuse, MANAGED CARE WK., Mar. 3, 1997, at *l. 
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payers by submitting false or fraudulent data to obtain 
payment.14 
Moreover, to the extent that many MCOs do not operate 
solely under capitation, but continue to reimburse for certain 
types of services on a fee-for-service basis, all of the traditional 
incentives for overutilization - and thus for overtreatment, 
kickbacks, and self-referral practices - continue to flourish.15 
On the other hand, while capitation clearly minimizes the overu­
tilization of services, it may also create incentives to do the re­
verse: to underutilize services, thereby reducing the cost of care 
provided to patients. MCOs can achieve this result by explicitly 
denying coverage for expensive services, a tactic that may lead 
to protracted court battles with unhappy enrollees. But MCOs 
also may adopt more subtle approaches, such as imposing long 
delays before appointments can be scheduled or locating physi­
cian offices in inconvenient locations - making it difficult for 
patients to access the services to which they are entitled.16 
Similarly, MCOs have an incentive to enroll the healthiest 
(and thus least costly) patients. Clearly, MCOs could accom­
plish this overtly, by declining to enroll sick patients or pressur­
ing patients who become severely ill to disenroll from the 
organization. Again, however, MCOs may achieve a similar re­
sult more subtly by directing their marketing activities toward 
healthier individuals, such as by distributing brochures at health 
clubs, or holding informational sessions in locations that are not 
handicapped accessible.17 Other reported marketing improprie­
ties have included overly aggressive recruitment tactics (particu­
larly involving the Medicaid population), misrepresentations 
regarding the scope of services covered or the patient's cost­
sharing portion, and enrolling fictitious patients in the MCO. In 
perhaps the most egregious cases, MCOs have been accused of 
enrolling actual patients without their knowledge.18 
As this brief listing indicates, the opportunities for improper 
activities in the managed care context are myriad. Depending 
on the applicable regulatory structure, these activities may be 
actionable at the state level under a variety of legal theories, 
14. See Davies & Jost, supra note 13, at 391-93.
15. See id. at 391.
16. See id. at 385-87.
17. See, e.g., Patricia Neuman et al., Marketing HMOs to Medicare Beneficiaries:
Do Medicare HMOs Target Healthy Seniors?, HEALTH AFFAIRS, July/Aug. 1997, at 
132, 135-36. 
18. See Davies & Jost, supra note 13, at 387-91.
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including: (1) traditional anti-fraud laws; (2) violation of appli­
cable insurance laws and regulations; and (3) laws designed to 
protect consumers from unfair trade practices. 
IL STATE RESPONSES TO MANAGED CARE FRAUD: 
THREE MODELS 
A. Traditional "Fraud and Abuse" Protections
Both the federal and state governments have enacted a vari­
ety of criminal, civil and administrative provisions to prohibit 
health care fraud, predominantly in the fee-for-service context. 
At the federal level, the most important anti-fraud laws include 
the Civil and Criminal False Claims Acts, the Medicare and 
Medicaid Anti-Kickback Statute, and broad administrative civil 
monetary penalty and exclusion authorities.19 States have en­
acted a similarly broad range of anti-fraud legislation, often 
modeled on comparable federal provisions, targeting false 
claims, fee splitting and kickbacks in connection with both pub­
lic programs and privately .funded health care.20 Under these 
provisions, violators may be subject to significant criminal fines 
and civil penalties, imprisonment, ineligibility for participation 
in certain government-sponsored programs, and professional 
discipline (including suspension or revocation of a professional 
license). 21 
To the extent that an MCO continues to make payments on a 
fee-for-service basis, such as by "carving out" certain types of 
services or paying specialists pursuant to a fee schedule rather 
than as part of the capitated rate, these anti-fraud laws should 
19. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (1998) (civil false claims); 18 U.S.C. § 287 (1998) (crimi­
nal false claims); 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b (1998) (Medicare and Medicaid fraud and anti­
kickback laws); 42 U.S.C. §1320a-7a (civil monetary penalties); 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7 
(1998) (exclusion). 
20. See, e.g., RI. GEN. LAWS§§ 5-48.1-1, 5-48.1-3 (West 1998) (all-payor anti-kick­
back prohibition); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 400.604 (Medicaid false claims), 
752.1004 (health care false claims) (West 1998); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 147.091(l)(p) 
(West 1998) (fee splitting constitutes grounds for disciplinary action against physi­
cian); ALA. ConE § 22-1-ll(b) (1998) (Medicaid anti-kickback prohibition); Georgia 
Medicaid Fraud Forfeiture Act, GA. CooE ANN. § 49-4-146.1-3 (1998). 
21. A recent New Jersey law combines several of these approaches, explicitly list­
ing violation of the health care claims fraud statute as one of the grounds for revoca­
tion of a health care practitioner's license. See 1997 N.J. SEss. LAW SERV. ch. 353 
(West). Some officials also have sought to extend the authority of the state Medicaid 
Fraud Control Units to investigate fraud in other sectors of federal and private health 
care programs. See, e.g., S. 2040, 105TH CoNG. (1998); Medicaid: Massachusetts At­
torney General Seeks Waiver to Expand Medicaid Fraud Control Unit Jurisdiction, 3 
BNA's HEALTH L. REP., Sept. 1, 1994, at 35. 
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apply to managed care in the same way they apply to traditional 
health care.22 With regard to other types of MCO activities, 
however, the application of these laws is less clear. For example, 
under capitation, a primary care physician receives a pre-set fee 
to provide care to an enrollee for a particular period of time; 
unlike under traditional insurance, no claims for specific services 
need be submitted in order to receive payment. While "encoun­
ter data" may be requested from the physician, it is used primar­
ily for statistical rather than for reimbursement purposes. Thus, 
if the physician fails to provide required services or misstates the 
nature of services provided, it may be difficult to identify any 
"claim" that has been submitted for payment, as may be re­
quired for the purposes of false claims or false statements liabil­
ity.23 Clearly, traditional anti-fraud provisions may not
adequately protect against all forms of managed care fraud. 
While commentators have called for revision of existing laws 
to explicitly define common managed care activities as actiona­
ble fraud and abuse, little progress appears to have been made 
at the state level.24 At present, only the expanding use of
mandatory managed care for the Medicaid population has gen­
erated sufficient concern to warrant the enactment of new crimi­
nal laws. For example, a recent New Mexico law criminalizes a 
variety of improper activities involving Medicaid managed care, 
including furnishing treatment that is "substantially inadequate" 
with intent that a "claim" ( defined broadly as any communica­
tion identifying a treatment, item, or service as reimbursable) be 
relied upon to expend public money.25 But to the extent that
traditional anti-fraud laws have not been amended ( or inter­
preted through case law) to explicitly prohibit similar activities, 
they will remain of limited use in addressing non-traditional 
forms of fraud and abuse in managed care. 
22. See Davies & Jost, supra note 13, at 390-92.
23. See id. at 396-97 ( describing problems with current criminal sanctions). De­
spite these problems, federal prosecutors have made clear their intention to address 
underutilization through application of the False Claims Act. See, e.g., Mary DuBois 
Krohn, Comment, The False Claims Act and Managed Care: Blowing the Whistle on 
Underutilization, 28 CuMB. L. REv. 443, 456-72 (1998); Fraud: Underutilization in 
Managed Care New Target of Joint Fraud Efforts, 4 BNA's HEALTH L. REP., Dec. 7, 
1995, at 47 (discussing formation of Department of Justice Managed Care and Fraud 
Working Group). 
24. See, e.g., Davies & Jost, supra note 13, at 411-12 (recommending that current
laws be amended to explicitly state that submission of false encounter data constitutes 
a false statement). 
25. 1997 N.M. LAws ch. 98, § 1 (adding N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-44-2(B), 30-44-
7A(2)(b) (Michie 1998)). 
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B. Regulation of the Insurance Industry
Rather than relying on traditional "fraud and abuse" laws, 
many states have made efforts to address MCO activities under 
the insurance regulatory structure. As both insurers and provid­
ers of health care, MCOs are regulated by state laws requiring 
licensure both for health care entities (e.g., HMOs), and for un­
dertaking certain types of common managed care activities (e.g., 
utilization review).26 In most states, HMOs must comply with 
requirements generally applicable to all licensed health insurers, 
as well as with traditional HMO-centered provisions (including 
recent legislation specifically targeting perceived abuses within 
the managed care industry). Rather than criminal or other 
traditional types of fraud prosecutions, MCOs increasingly face 
investigations and administrative proceedings for failure to com­
ply with these licensure requirements - an approach that may 
offer advantages for state officials. 
For example, MCOs are subject to a host of administrative 
requirements regarding the business of insurance, including laws 
regulating the content and sale of insurance policy forms.27 An 
increasingly common requirement is that insurers create internal 
programs designed to identify fraudulent practices. In Califor­
nia, for example, insurance carriers have been required by regu­
lation for several years to establish "Special Investigative Units" 
to detect and investigate suspected fraudulent claims, train 
claims handlers to identify possible fraudulent claims, and facili­
tate reporting of fraudulent claims to state regulators.28 Similar 
requirements now exist in almost half of the states, and regula­
tors have begun to enforce these laws against non-compliant in­
surers and MCOs alike.29 
26. See, e.g., TEX. INs. CODE ANN. ch. 20A (HMO Act), art. 21.58A (utilization
review) (West 1998). 
27. See, e.g., Plan Regulation: Colorado Regulators Fine Kaiser For Various Policy­
Form Violations (hereinafter "Kaiser"), 4 BNA's MANAGED. CARE REP., Sept. 16, 
1998, at 912, 913 (describing fines imposed on Kaiser and several of its competitors 
under recently enacted health insurance reform laws). 
28. See CAL. CoDE REos. tit. 10, § 2698.40 (1998). Recent legislation imposed
similar anti-fraud requirements on HMOs. See CAi. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1348 
(West 1998) (requiring each health care service plan to establish an anti-fraud plan, 
refer suspected fraud cases to a law enforcement agency, and submit an annual report 
to the Insurance Commissioner). 
29. See, e.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REos. tit. 11, § 86.6 (1998) (requiring insur­
ers to develop fraud prevention plans); State Takes Action Against Insurers That Do 
Not Have Anti-Fraud Programs, 2 BNA's HEALTH CARE FRAUD REP., July 1, 1998, at 
488; Kirk J. Nahra, MCOs Need to Adopt New Mindset to Pursue Anti-Fraud Activity, 
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MCOs are also required to comply with state provisions regu­
lating the payment of insurance claims. These laws and regula­
tions often include "prompt payment" requirements, which 
mandate that "clean" claims (i.e., complete claims without any 
defects) be paid within a certain time period after receipt.30 Re­
cently, several MCOs in New York were accused of violating 
these requirements, and ultimately entered into negotiations 
with state regulators to resolve the allegations.31 Similarly, 
Maryland regulators recently prevented an HMO from recoup­
ing overpayments to doctors in violation of a 1997 law that lim­
ited such "retroactive denials" to six-months after payment.32 
Moreover, the recent "backlash" against managed care has fu­
eled a variety of legislative and enforcement initiatives designed 
to prohibit what are perceived as particularly egregious MCO 
activities.33 Among the more popular initiatives are laws 
prohibiting MCOs from using financial incentives that induce 
physicians to limit "medically necessary" care,34 imposing con­
tractual "gag clauses" that restrict physician communications 
with patients,35 and denying payment for emergency care fur-
2 BNA's HEALTH CARE FRAUD REP., June 17, 1998, at 456,457 (describing efforts in 
New York and New Jersey). 
30. See, e.g., N.Y. INs. LAW § 3224-a (McKinney 1998) (requiring insurers to pay
claims within 45 days of receipt); N.J. AoMIN. CooE tit. 8, § 8:38-16.1 (1998} (requir­
ing HMOs to pay clean claims within 60 calendar days of receipt). 
31. See, e.g., Claims Administration: New York Attorney General Seeks Talks On
Aetna U.S. Healthcare Payment Delays, 4 BNA's MANAGED CARE REP., Aug. 12, 
1998, at 814 (describing attorney general's negotiations with Aetna, as well as a previ­
ous settlement with Oxford Health Plans, Inc. involving similar allegations). 
32. See Mo. CooE ANN., INS. § 15-1008 (1998) (retroactive denial of reimburse­
ment); MAMSI Ordered to Comply Again with Maryland Claims Payment Law, 2 
BNA's HEALTH CARE FRAUD REP., Aug. 12, 1998, at 605. 
33. See, e.g., Blendon et al., supra note 1, at 82; States Setting Detailed Quality
Standards Rather Than "Legislating By Body Part," 7 BNA's HEALTH L. REP., July 2, 
1998, at 1059 (noting that more than half of all states considered bills in the first half 
of 1998 to regulate MCO quality of care). 
34. See D. Ward Pimley, States Tell Health Plans That Incentives May Not Limit
Medically Necessary Care, 4 BNA's MANAGED CARE REP., Oct. 14, 1998, at 1030-31 
(at least 21 states have addressed this issue). However, there is little guidance re­
garding exactly which types of incentives will fall within these prohibitions. See, e.g., 
Insurance Commissioner Abandons Plan For HMO Financial Incentive Guidelines, 2 
BNA's HEALTH CARE FRAUD REP., Nov. 18, 1998, at 882 (describing failed effort to 
formulate guidance regarding TEX. INS. CooE ANN. § 20A.14(/) (West 1998)). 
35. See, e.g., GA. CooE ANN.§ 33-20A-7 (1998) ("No health care provider may be
penalized for discussing medically necessary or appropriate care with or on behalf of 
his or her patient."); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 62J.71(1}(1} (West 1998} (prohibiting "any 
agreement or directive that prohibits a health care provider from communicating with 
an enrollee with respect to the enrollee's health status, health care, or treatment op­
tions"). A number of statutes also prohibit health plans from penalizing providers 
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nished in out-of-network hospitals,36 as well as laws mandating 
coverage of specific benefits or the services of specific types of 
health care professionals.37 Thus, in addition to long-standing 
licensure requirements, MCOs must now comply with an in­
creasing number of new managed care-specific provisions. 
The ability to pursue MCO activities as a violation of relevant 
insurance requirements, rather than as criminal or civil "fraud," 
offers some advantages to state regulators.38 In contrast to po­
tential imprisonment, exclusion and the extensive fines and pen­
alties that can be imposed under traditional fraud and abuse 
laws, violations of state insurance provisions traditionally have 
been addressed through lesser fines, cease and desist orders, and 
injunctive relief. More serious penalties, including license revo­
cation and suspension, usually are imposed only for repeated vi­
olations or otherwise egregious practices.39 
In addition, the detailed nature of insurance requirements 
may make it easier to identify the steps that must be taken by 
who advocate on behalf of their patients. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, 
§ 991.2113(c)(l).
36. See, e.g., Vickie Yates Brown & Barbara Reid Hartung, Managed Care at the
Crossroads: Can Managed Care Organizations Survive Government Regulation?, 7 
ANNALS HEALTH L. 25, 40-41 (1998); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1371.4(c) 
(West 1998) (requiring payment for emergency services unless enrollee "reasonably 
should have known" that it was not an emergency); State's Suit Against Kai.ser Alleges 
Emergency Care Claims Denied, Delayed, 2 BNA's HEALTH CARE FRAUD REP., July 
29, 1998, at 561 (describing Texas v. Kaiser Found. Health Plans, No. 9807419 (Tex. 
Dist. Ct., filed July 13, 1998)). 
37. See Brown & Hartung, supra note 36, at 33-35 (describing state mandated ben­
efits laws), 36-40 (describing "any willing provider" laws that force MCOs to contract 
with any provider willing to accept the MCO's terms). 
38. For a description of recent state "anti-fraud" efforts centering on MCO fail­
ures to comply with relevant regulatory provisions, see Kristen Hallam & Chris 
Rauber, Fraud Probes Target HMOs: States Attack Plans for False Marketing, Care 
Denials, Moo. HEALTHCARE, Sept. 14, 1998, at 22 (describing MCO fraud probes in 
California, New York, and South Carolina, alleging that HMOs have used misleading 
marketing materials, improperly denied enrollees access to mental health profession­
als, improperly delayed claims payment, and engaged in improper enrollment and 
disenrollment activities). 
39. For example, the Texas Insurance Code provides for revocation of an insurer's
license for violations of (or failure to comply with) the relevant laws, rules or regula­
tions. In lieu of revocation, the Commissioner may: (1) suspend a license for not 
more than one year; (2) enter a cease and desist order; (3) impose an administrative 
penalty (generally not to exceed $25,000); or (4) require the violator to make restitu­
tion. See T Ex. INS. CooE ANN. art. 1.10(7), 1.10A (cease and desist orders), 1.lOE 
(monetary penalties) (West 1998). See also N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 26:2S-16, 26:2S-24 
(West 1998) (imposing civil penalties, license suspension or revocation, cease and de­
sist orders, and/or injunctive relief against licensed insurer or MCO that violates anti­
gag clause law). 
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the MCO to bring its activities into compliance.40 Where viola­
tive activities can be identified and corrected, and past practices 
can be remedied through restitution and the imposition of rea­
sonable fines, interruption in the MCO's provision of services 
should be minimal. Moreover, the ability to look to detailed in­
surance requirements also makes it possible to craft settlements 
carefully targeted to eliminating the problematic behavior, 
rather than addressing improper conduct solely with the "blunt­
edged sword" of large financial penalties or exclusion from gov­
ernment programs.41
C. Consumer Protection
In addition to potentially violating state fraud and insurance 
laws, improper MCO activities also may be construed as a 
breach of the terms of the enrollment agreement ( at least as 
those terms were understood by the enrollee). By consistently 
using a misleading enrollment agreement, or marketing policies 
in an inappropriate manner, the MCO clearly may violate the 
insurance provisions described above. To the extent that the 
MCO's actions are misleading or improper only with respect to 
an individual enrollee, that enrollee theoretically may have a vi­
able cause of action against the MCO under a variety of legal 
theories, including breach of contract42 and the torts of misrep­
resentation, common law fraud, and bad faith breach of con­
tract.43 As Professor Joanne Stem has noted: 
40. See, e.g., Kaiser, supra note 27, at 912 (identifying specific deficiencies in Kai­
ser's policies, such as inadequate disclosure of prostate screening availability and 
overly restrictive definitions of certain terms). 
41. For example, even prior to enactment of the New York prompt payment legis­
lation, Oxford Health Plans settled allegations of claims delays by instituting a timely 
payment schedule and agreeing to pay providers interest on delayed claims. See Ox­
ford Agrees to Pay Providers Interest on Delayed Claims, Ending Investigation (herein­
after "Oxford"), 3 BNA's MANAGED CARE REP., Aug. 6, 1997, at 753, 754. 
42. See, e.g., McClellan v. Health Maint. Org., 604 A.2d 1053, 1061-62 (Pa. Super.
1992) (plaintiffs' allegations that MCO breached the subscriber contract, based on the 
MCO's express representations regarding the competency of its physicians and access 
to specialists, were sufficient to withstand a demurrer). 
43. See, e.g., McEvoy v. Group Health Coop., 570 N.W.2d 397 (Wis. 1997) (hold­
ing that the common law tort of bad faith applies to HM Os when they make decisions 
regarding the coverage of out-of-network benefits). However, it may be difficult for 
plaintiffs to succeed on these claims. See, e.g., Humana Hospital-Bayside v. Lightle, 
407 S.E.2d 637 (S.C. 1991) (plaintiff unsuccessfully alleged negligence, fraud, bad faith 
and estoppel against HMO for failure to pay claim for emergency services where 
HMO was not notified of hospitalization within time period required by the sub­
scriber contract); Kathy L. Cerminara, The Class Action Suit as a Method of Patient 
Empowerment in the Managed Care Setting, 24 AM. J. L. & MED. 7, 28-29 (1998) 
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[C]ertain insurance cases have pointed to the consumer's mis­
placed reliance on company slogans and advertisements prom­
ising security ("a piece of the rock"), partiality and concern
("we're on your side"), and peace of mind ("you're in good
hands"). When the "good hands" drop you arbitrarily or you
discover that "your side" consistently is not their side, this may
lead to a tort action based on breach of the good faith cove­
nant, as well as on fraud and misrepresentation.44
However, plaintiffs often face significant legal obstacles m 
challenging their MCOs. 
In particular, where the patient is enrolled in the MCO 
through an employee benefit plan, many of these causes of ac­
tion may be preempted by the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA").45 As one means of promoting 
safety and uniformity in the administration of plans nationwide, 
ERISA preempts state laws that "relate to any employee benefit 
plan," with the exception of laws that regulate insurance, bank­
ing, or securities.46 Although primarily designed to protect em­
ployees and their dependents, this broad "preemption clause" 
has also been used as an affirmative defense by HMOs, who suc­
cessfully have argued that tort and contract suits by patients 
covered by employer-sponsored health benefit plans are pre­
empted because such suits "relate to" the administration of the 
health plan.47 
Rather than relying on common law theories of tort and con­
tract, patients and state regulators have begun to look to an-
(noting heavy burden of proof that plaintiffs must meet in order to prove common law 
fraud claims). 
44. Joanne B. Stem, Bad Faith Suits: Are They Applicable to Health Maintenance
Organizations?, 85 W. VA. L. REv. 911, 925 (1983). 
45. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. (1998).
46. See id. § 1144(a), (b)(2)(A).
47. See, e.g., Toledo v. Kaiser Permanente Med. Group, 987 F. Supp. 1174 (N.D.
Cal. 1997) (plaintiffs' allegations of breach of contract, breach of implied covenant of 
good faith, fraud, and infliction of emotional distress were preempted under ERISA); 
Ryan v. Fallon Community Health Plan, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 34, 37-38 (D. Mass. 1996) 
(common law breach of contract claims are preempted by ERISA); McClellan, 604 
A.2d at 1062 (although record was not sufficient to resolve the question, court noted
that if the defendant "is a valid ERISA employee benefit plan, it would appear that
the contract claims are preempted"); McManus v. Travelers Health Network, 742 F.
Supp. 377, 379-80 (W.D. Tex. 1990) (common law claims of breach of duty of good
faith and fair dealing are preempted under ERISA). But see HealthAmerica v. Men­
ton, 551 So. 2d 235 (Ala. 1989) (ERISA does not preempt common law action for
fraud in the inducement because allegation that plaintiff relied on defendant's misrep­
resentations in dropping his previous insurance and electing defendant's coverage
does not "relate to" an employee benefit plan).
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other source for protection: state consumer protection laws, 
which generally prohibit "unfair methods of competition" and 
"unfair or deceptive trade practices."48 Unlike more recent pro­
visions enacted specifically to protect patients from specific 
managed care activities, these laws protect patients as "consum­
ers" in their "business" dealings with MCOs. The use of tradi­
tional consumer protection statutes provides a number of 
advantages for plaintiffs. From an advocacy perspective, MCO 
enrollees' ability to use these laws situates their disputes 
squarely within the rich tradition of consumer protection ac­
tions, and may help to rally patients and legislators to fight for 
the rights of health care patients.49 From a practical perspective, 
these statutes are useful because they often permit private ac­
tions by competitors or consumers who have been injured by the 
unfair practice, in addition to permitting actions by the state at­
torney general.50 Moreover, the penalties available under these 
laws are extremely broad, including discontinuance of the im­
proper practice, injunctive relief, restitution, civil penalties pay­
able to the state, and dissolution of a business entity or loss of 
the right to do business in the state (for repeated violations). 
Additionally, double or treble damages, as well as costs and at­
torney fees, are often available for private plaintiffs who can 
prove certain wilful violations.51 
Yet the road to consumer protection for patients has not been 
a smooth one. Most consumer protection statutes apply only to 
48. These laws are often based on the Federal Trade Commission Act or model
consumer protection statutes, such as the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Pro­
tection Law, the Uniform Consumer Sales Practices Act, and the Uniform Deceptive 
Trade Practices Act. See Lee Ann Bundren, State Consumer Fraud Legislation Ap­
plied to the Health Care Industry: Are Health Care Professionals Being "Consumed"?, 
16 J. LEG. MED. 133, 134-36 (1995) (describing various models of consumer protec­
tion); M1cHAEL M. GREENFIELD, CoNSUMER LAw: A GurnE FOR THOSE WHo REP­
RESENT SELLERS, LENDERS, AND CONSUMERS 159-63 (1995). 
49. See generally Cerminara, supra note 43, at 18-19 (describing relatively power­
less status of patients in managed care, and the heightened need for consumerism). 
However, not all patient rights advocates agree that consumerism is an acceptable 
model. As Professor George Annas has argued, "We can call people who buy health 
insurance consumers and people who join health plans members, but we must recog­
nize that sick people who seek medical care are patients with rights that should be 
protected." George J. Annas, A National Bill of Patients' Rights, 338 NEw ENGL. J. 
MED. 695, 697 (1998). 
50. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A, §§ 4, 9, 11 (West 1998). By con­
trast, traditional fraud and abuse statutes and insurance regulations usually do not 
allow private rights of action for damages ( outside of the False Claims Act qui tam 
context). See Bundren, supra note 48, at 164. 
51. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 93A, §§ 4-5, 8-9, 11 (West 1998); Bun­
dren, supra note 48, at 164-65. 
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"goods or services" in "trade or commerce," and not to "profes­
sional services." The traditional theory behind such exclusions 
is that professions such as medicine are regulated by other 
means, most notably the professional licensure and disciplinary 
structure.52 Moreover, in an attempt to limit the reach of these 
laws to activities that were not otherwise actionable under com­
mon law tort and contract theories, legislators and courts often 
restricted these laws to situations where the activities at issue 
affected the public interest, and resulted ( or had the potential to 
result) in public injury.53
As the practice of medicine has increasingly grown to resem­
ble that of a traditional business, however, legislative and judi­
cial recognition of both the professional exclusion and the public 
injury requirement have waned. For example, in 1990, the Illi­
nois legislature amended the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive 
Business Practices Act to abolish the public injury requirement; 
a federal district court later relied on this amendment in holding 
that the "business aspects" of medicine were not exempted from 
the law.54 Similarly, the Minnesota Court of Appeals has recog­
nized that patients may have a private right of action against 
physicians under the state's Consumer Fraud Act, provided they 
can prove the existence of the requisite financial injury.55 And 
even where the actual practice of medicine by a physician re­
mains exempted, courts have applied consumer protection stat­
utes to health care business entities, including HMOs. In 
Johnston v. Anchor Organization for Health Maintenance, for 
example, the Illinois Appellate Court held that an HMO's mis­
representations regarding the payment of a patient's bills (in­
cluding a refusal to cover previously approved care, 
concealment of eventual payment of the bill, and misrepresenta­
tions that the patient still owed money) were actionable under 
52. See, e.g., Bundren, supra note 48, at 141; OHio REv. Cooe ANN. § 1345.01
(Anderson 1998) (excluding dealings between physicians and patients from the defini­
tion of "consumer transactions" covered by the Consumer Sales Practices Act). 
53. See, e.g. Bundren, supra note 48, at 138-41.
54. See Gadson v. Newman, 807 F. Supp. 1412, 1415-18 (C.D. Ill. 1992). The
current version of the statute requires "[p]roof of a public injury, a pattern, or an 
effect on consumers and the public interest" in actions against vehicle dealers, but is 
silent regarding actions against others. See 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/lOa(a) (West 
1998). 
55. See D.A.B. v. Brown, 570 N.W.2d 168, 172-73 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (dis­
missing Consumer Fraud Act claims by patients against physician previously con­
victed of accepting kickbacks in connection with the prescription of a particular drug, 
on the grounds that plaintiffs failed to allege the requisite injury). 
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the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices 
Act.56 
In fact, the potential conflicts of interest inherent in many 
managed care financial arrangements, combined with patients' 
relative lack of power, would appear to warrant increased appli­
cation of consumer protection statutes to MCOs.57 For patients, 
however, the biggest obstacle to successful suits may continue to 
be the federal law of ERISA. Federal courts have held that con­
sumer protection statutes are preempted as applied to MCO en­
rollees who receive health benefits from their employers 
because the claims usually "relate to" employee benefit plans, 
and the statutes cannot be "saved" as laws primarily regulating 
the business of insurance. In Anderson v. Humana, for example, 
the Seventh Circuit rejected a challenge under the Illinois Con­
sumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act by an 
ERISA plan participant who alleged that her HMO's incentive 
structure perpetrated a fraud on consumers.58 Finding that the 
particular health plan information sought by the plaintiff would 
require a revision of various plan documents, the court held that 
the claim clearly "related to" the employee benefit plan. Apply­
ing the traditional definition of the "business of insurance," the 
court soundly rejected any argument that the consumer protec­
tion statute was "saved" as a law regulating the business of 
msurance: 
Anderson invokes not a law regulating the methods of pooling 
risks or the prices to be charged. Instead she contends that 
Humana deceived consumers about the costs and benefits of 
the choices open to them under ERISA plans. . . Anderson 
relies on an all-purpose truth-in-business statute, applicable 
primarily to used car salesmen and the promotional literature 
for vacuum cleaners. It does not apply to insurance at all-not 
directly, anyway.59 
Because the plaintiff failed to argue that the HMO's actions 
violated ERISA itself, the court upheld dismissal of the 
complaint.60 
56. See Johnson, 621 N.E.2d 137 (Ill. Ct. App. 1993).
57. See, e.g., Bundren, supra note 48, at 153-60 (arguing that HMOs are appropri-
ate targets for consumer protection actions). 
58. See Anderson, 24 F.3d 889 (7th Cir. 1994).
59. Id. at 892.
60. See also Ryan, 921 F. Supp. at 38 (Massachusetts consumer protection statute
"clearly is not a state statute which regulates insurance"); McManus, 742 F. Supp. at 
382 (Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act does not fall within ERISA's savings 
clause). The Federal Employees Health Benefits Act also has been held to preempt 
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In contrast, in Napoletano v. CIGNA Healthcare, the Supreme 
Court of Connecticut allowed a group of physicians who had 
been removed from a managed care health network, as well as 
their patients, to sue under the Connecticut Unfair Trade Prac­
tices and Unfair Insurance Practices Acts.61 The court explained 
that the plaintiffs' allegations in the case did not "relate to" the 
employee benefit plan: 
Rather than affecting or prescribing the establishment, admin­
istration, regulation or maintenance of an employee benefit 
plan, the plaintiffs' claims merely tum on requiring CIGNA to 
enforce the benefit plan that it has already established and is 
maintaining. . . . Neither class of plaintiffs is requesting that 
CIGNA change the method by which it determines which phy­
sicians will be providers under its plan-in other words, the 
plaintiffs are not claiming that CIGNA should change its list of 
criteria. Instead, the plaintiffs are merely asking that CIGNA 
disclose its criteria and, subsequently, adhere to them.62 
Because it found the claims did not "relate to" an employee 
benefit plan, the court did not address the issue of whether the 
consumer protection laws would fall within the savings clause.63 
Thus, whether an action based on violation of state consumer 
protection laws will be subject to ERISA preemption is likely to 
depend on the substance of the underlying dispute. Despite the 
potential pitfalls associated with the consumer protection pri-
consumer protection claims against HMOs by federal employees who receive medical 
benefits through the government's employee benefits program. See, e.g., Negron v. 
Patel, 6 F. Supp. 2d 366 (E.D. Pa. 1998). In many of the BRISA cases, the plaintiffs 
have sought to rely on the consumer protection statute only after arguing unsuccess­
fully for a private right of action under the relevant insurance regulations - which 
presumably would fall within the savings clause. See, e.g., Anderson, 24 F.3d at 892 
(no private right of action under insurance regulations tracking the Consumer Fraud 
Act); Ryan, 921 F. Supp. at 38 (rejecting private right of action under insurance code). 
61. See Napoletano, 680 A.2d 127 (Conn. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1106
(1997). 
62. Id. at 143. Cf Moran v. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc., No. 98 C 0422, 1998 WL
325204 (N.D. Ill. June 9, 1998) (remanding to state court plaintiffs suit for specific 
performance by HMO under state law requiring HMOs to provide independent phy­
sician review of medical necessity, on the grounds that it was not an ERISA"claim). 
63. However, a federal district court had held two years earlier that a plaintiff's
claims under the same laws that her insurer improperly released her husband from a 
treatment center, leading to his subsequent suicide, were preempted because they 
were "based on the contention that defendant improperly administered her husband's 
claim." See Bailey-Gates v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 890 F. Supp. 73, 77 (D. Conn. 1994). 
The court went on to note that "it is well established in this district that ERISA's 
savings clause does not except the [consumer protection] claims from preemption." 
Id. at 79. 
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vate right of action, it may remain a viable cause of action under 
certain circumstances. 
Moreover, consumer protection statutes offer a great deal of 
flexibility to state attorneys general, who have crafted innova­
tive settlements with health care entities. For example, even 
before the enactment of the New York health insurer prompt 
payment requirements, Attorney General Dennis Vacco in­
voked the general consumer protection laws to investigate pay­
ment delays by Oxford Health Plans, an investigation that 
resulted in Oxford's agreement to pay interest on delayed claims 
and to establish a schedule of timely payments.64 Regardless of 
whether these allegations would have prevailed in court, these 
settlements demonstrate the significant power and flexibility of 
consumer protection laws as applied to the health industry by 
state regulators, and sound a cautionary note for future MCO 
practices. 
III. THE ROLES OF THE STATE AND FEDERAL
GOVERNMENTS 
Clearly, the states have a great deal of flexibility to address 
improper activities by MCOs. Activities may be pursued as vio­
lations of relevant insurance requirements, either general or 
MCO-specific, which are likely to result in fines and agreements 
to cease the improper behavior. Activities also may be ad­
dressed through consumer protection actions, brought by the at­
torney general or by individual MCO subscribers, resulting in 
damages, fines, injunctive relief and restitution. In more egre­
gious cases, when there is concrete evidence of an intent to de­
fraud patients or payers, violators may be pursued through 
traditional anti-fraud laws, potentially resulting in heavy fines or 
penalties (including criminal liability). State regulators may 
combine or choose among these options in tailoring settlements 
64. See Oxford, supra note 41, at 753. Similarly, in the mid-1990s, there were sev­
eral agreements between drug manufacturers and a consortium of state attorneys gen­
eral that resulted in payment of substantial fines under state consumer protection 
laws. In one of these cases, the manufacturer had instituted a program (without pa­
tient knowledge) under which it offered to compensate pharmacists for "educating" 
patients whom they convinced to switch to the manufacturers' newer products - al­
legedly failing to provide for appropriate disclosure to consumers. See, e.g., In re 
Upjohn Co., No. C?-94-7856, Order Approving Assurance of Discontinuance (Ram­
sey Cty. Dist. Ct., Aug. 1, 1994) (settlement with Attorneys General in Minnesota, 
Arizona, Iowa, Missouri, New York, North Carolina, Texas and Wisconsin) (copy on 
file with author). 
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or enforcement actions that target the specific activities 
involved. 
In contrast, the federal government appears to have fewer op­
tions to address MCO activities. Unlike the states, the federal 
government does not license health care professionals or enti­
ties; it merely determines which state-licensed individuals and 
entities will be permitted to receive payment for treating pa­
tients under the various federal health care programs.65 Accord­
ingly, federal settlements tend to consist of repayment of 
improperly received funds, payment of sizeable civil penalties or 
criminal fines, the imposition of onerous procedures designed to 
assure future compliance with program rules and, in the most 
egregious cases, imprisonment or exclusion from participation in 
all government-funded health plans.66 The opportunities to tai­
lor a settlement to the specific allegations at issue, except per­
haps by varying the amount of the penalty or the specific 
conditions of the corporate integrity agreement, are limited. 
This dual approach to MCO regulation may have a number of 
unintended effects, particularly with respect to the characteriza­
tion of government investigations. While improper activities in 
the state context may be characterized as a mere "failure to 
comply" with relevant insurance requirements, those under­
taken in the context of federal health care programs are invaria­
bly investigated, publicized, and denounced as outright "fraud." 
As an example, consider two articles that appeared in the trade 
press during the summer of 1998 regarding MCO failures to pay 
claims in a timely manner. One article, appearing under the 
heading "Claims Administration," described the New York At­
torney General's desire to hear Aetna U.S. Healthcare's "side of 
the story" and to negotiate a resolution regarding allegations of 
delayed payment.67 Yet on the very next page, an article under 
65. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395 (providing that "[n]othing in [the Medicare law]
shall be construed to authorize any Federal officer or employee to exercise any super­
vision or control over the practice of medicine or the manner in which medical serv­
ices are provided"), 1395w-25(a) (requiring that all Medicare+Choice organizations 
be licensed under state law as risk-bearing entities eligible to offer health insurance or 
health benefits coverage, with the exception of certain provider-sponsored organiza­
tions) (1998). 
66. Settlements often result in the imposition of mandatory "corporate integrity
agreements" to assure future legal compliance. See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Wagner v. Allied 
Clin. Labs., No. C-1-94-092 (S.D. Ohio, Mar. 20, 1995), reprinted in MEDICARE & 
MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) <JI 43,142. 
67. See Claims Administration: New York Attorney General Seeks Talks on Aetna
U.S. Healthcare Payment Delays, 4 BNA's MANAGED CARE REP., Aug. 12, 1998, at 
814.
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the heading "Fraud and Abuse" related comments made by an 
Assistant U.S. Attorney and an F.B.I. supervisor, both of whom 
indicated that the federal government would aggressively pursue 
the same activity - MCO payment delays - under civil and 
criminal anti-fraud laws.68
While the differences in characterization may be understanda­
ble, this example certainly illustrates the confusing and some­
what contradictory approaches taken at the federal and state 
levels. It also raises the somewhat disturbing possibility that 
whether or not an MCO is engaged in "fraud" depends not on 
what the MCO is doing, but on who is investigating. More im­
portantly, it raises the question of which approach better serves 
MCO patients. Clearly, low quality MCOs, or those that engage 
in truly fraudulent activities, should lose their ability to provide 
services to patients - a result that can be achieved under either 
the state or federal approaches. But what of the MCO that en­
gages in less abusive practices, violating applicable requirements 
without the risk of patient harm or threat of loss to government 
programs? Patients of these entities would appear to be better 
served by a regulatory settlement requiring the MCO to return 
improperly paid funds, pay a reasonable fine, and cease the of­
fensive activities, instead of requiring the organization to pay an 
enormous penalty under the False Claims Act and threatening 
the MCO with the possibility of criminal liability and/or exclu­
sion. Thus, the flexibility available to state officials would ap­
pear to better serve the interests of the patient population the 
laws are designed to protect. 
The federal government has begun to recognize the impor­
tance of so-called "intermediate sanctions" providing for less 
draconian remedies than termination of the MCO's ability to 
serve Medicare and Medicaid patients. Since 1994, the OIG has 
had the authority to suspend enrollment or payment and to im­
pose moderate civil penalties on HMOs that engage in a variety 
of improper activities, such as failing to provide medically neces­
sary items and services, improperly disenrolling or refusing to 
enroll beneficiaries, misrepresenting or falsifying information, 
or failing to comply with prompt payment requirements.69 As 
one author has noted, these intermediate sanctions were neces-
68. See Fraud and Abuse: MCOs Face Potential Criminal Actions for Claims Pay­
ment Delays, Denials, 4 BNA's MANAGED CARE REP., Aug. 12; 1998, at 815. 
69. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395mm(I)(6)(A), 1396b(m)(5)(A) (1998); 42 C.F.R.
§ 417.S00(a) (1997).
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sary because the Health Care Financing Administration 
("HCFA") previously had been "reluctant to impose th[e] ulti­
mate sanction [ of termination] because this could result in less 
access to care for Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries. "70 
These authorities have been augmented by additional ( and con­
troversial) requirements imposed on MCOs by the new Medi­
care+Choice regulations, including requirements that the MCO 
establish a compliance program, submit marketing materials for 
approval, certify the accuracy of all encounter data, and adopt 
specific types of grievance procedures.71
The ultimate effect of these new federal regulations is unclear. 
To the extent that they impose new requirements on MCOs sim­
ilar to those imposed under the traditional state insurance licen­
sure process, they should allow the federal government more 
flexibility in crafting settlements to better target specific im­
proper MCO activities. However, to the extent that the new 
regulations merely duplicate (or preempt)72 existing state insur­
ance requirements, they are likely to confuse the process even 
more, and subject both MCOs and their patients to an even 
more fragmented anti-fraud universe. 
CONCLUSION 
As this Article has argued, the states currently have a great 
deal more flexibility than the federal government to pursue im­
proper MCO activities under a variety of theories, ranging from 
insurance regulation to traditional anti-fraud laws. This, in tum, 
allows the states to craft targeted settlements to address poten­
tial problems without interrupting patient access to care. There 
are some indications that the federal government is attempting 
to broaden its authority over more "regulatory" MCO viola­
tions, potentially offering greater flexibility at the federal level 
as well. However, the federal government still lags behind the 
states in this respect. Yet regardless of whether the authority is 
wielded by the federal government or by a state, the object of 
70. See W. Bradley Tully, New Intermediate Sanctions are Bad News for Managed
Care, 9 HEALTHSPAN 15 (1994). 
71. See 63 Fed. Reg. 34,968 (1998) (interim final rule with comment period). See
also 63 Fed. Reg. 52,022 (1998) (similar requirements contained in the proposed rule 
allowing states greater flexibility to require Medicaid recipients to enroll in MCOs). 
The breadth of the Medicare+Choice regulations has been controversial, however, 
and it remains to be seen whether many of these requirements will be implemented. 
72. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-26(b)(3) (1998) (Medicare+Choice standards supersede
inconsistent state laws or regulations). 
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MCO anti-fraud efforts should be the same: to achieve an ap­
propriate resolution of the problem without imposing costs so 
great that they jeopardize the MCO's ability to provide quality 
services to its patients. Or, in the immortal words of Gilbert and 
Sullivan, the goal should be "to let the punishment fit the 
crime."73 
73. W.S. Gilbert, "The Mikado, or The Town .of Titipu," in THE BEST KNoWN
WORKS OF w.s. GILBERT 143-44 (1932). 
